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Abstract
We consider the zero-endpoint infinite-horizon LQ problem. We show that the existence of an
optimal policy in the class of feedback controls is a sufficient condition for the existence of a
stabilizing solution to the algebraic Riccati equation. This result is shown without assuming
positive definiteness of the state weighting matrix. The feedback formulation of the optimization
problem is natural in the context of differential games and we provide a characterization of
feedback Nash equilibria both in a deterministic and stochastic context.
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1 Introduction
The indefinite, regular, zero-endpoint, infinite-horizon LQ (IRZILQ) problem is the problem of








with Q = QT , R > 0, and where the state variable x is the solution of ẋ = Ax+Bu, x(0) = x0.
Here the class of control functions Us(x0) is defined by:
Us(x0) =
½
u ∈ L2,loc|J(x0, u) exists in IR ∪ {−∞,∞}, lim
t→∞x(t) = 0
¾
(see e.g. Willems, 1971, Molinari, 1977, or Trentelman & Willems, 1991). In addition to this
class of control functions we also consider the set of linear, internally stabilizing, time-invariant
feedback matrices, i.e.
F := {F |A+BF is stable}.
A state feedback control function corresponding to a feedback matrix F and an initial state x0
is denoted by uF B(x0, F ). The following statements are relevant for the IRZILQ problem:
(i) ∀x0 ∃û ∈ Us(x0) ∀u ∈ Us(x0) J(x0, û) ≤ J(x0, u);














F B(x0, F )
´
;
(iv) ∆ is positive definite where ∆ denotes the difference between the largest and smallest real
symmetric solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (3) below;
(v) The algebraic Riccati equation (3) has a stabilizing solution.
It is immediately clear that (ii)⇒ (i),(iii). Willems (1971, Theorems 5 and 7) (see also Trentel-
man & Willems, 1991, Theorem 8.8.2) showed that (i) ⇔ (iv) ⇒ (ii) and (iv) ⇔ (v) under
the assumption that (A,B) is controllable and that the algebraic Riccati equation has a real
symmetric solution. In the present paper we shall prove the equivalence (iii) ⇔ (v) in Section
2
3. This will be done without assuming controllability. The implication (v) ⇒ (iii) follows from
a simple completion of the squares. Clearly, if the system is controllable, this relation also
follows from the work of Willems via (v) ⇒ (iv) ⇒ (ii) ⇒ (iii). The main contribution of the
present paper is the converse implication, i.e. (iii) ⇒ (v). In fact this can be formulated as a
parametric optimization problem and we will use a matrix differentiation argument to solve it.
If the system is controllable, this result implies that all the statements (i),. . .,(v) are equivalent.
It is well-known from the certainty equivalence principle that the algebraic Riccati equation also
appears in LQG optimal control theory. Therefore, it is to be expected that the equivalence
result (iii) ⇔ (v) can be translated in a stochastic context. This is done in Section 4. More
precisely, in this section we consider a sixth statement in addition to the statements (i),. . . ,(v)
and show that this statement is also equivalent to statement (v).
We were motivated to study this problem by studying feedback Nash equilibria for infinite-
horizon LQ differential games (Başar and Olsder, 1999). The equivalence (iii) ⇔ (v) leads
straightforwardly to a characterization of feedback Nash equilibria in terms of stabilizing solu-
tions of a set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations. In such an equilibrium, the strategy space
of each player is restricted to linear time-invariant state feedback matrices, and furthermore,
the resulting closed-loop system is required to be stable. A precise discussion is given in Sec-
tion 5.1. The stochastic interpretation studied in Section 4 is generalized in Section 5.2 to a
stochastic differential game setting. In this final section we define the concept of a stochastic
variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium.
2 Preliminaries





. Clearly, for each
F ∈ F we have J(x0, F ) = xT0 ϕ(F )x0 with ϕ : F → IRn×n defined by ϕ : F 7→ P where P is
the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
(A+BF )TP + P (A+BF ) = −(Q+ FTRF ). (2)
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The algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) corresponding to our problem is given by
Q+ATX +XA−XBR−1BTX = 0. (3)
A solution X of this equation is called stabilizing if the matrix A−BR−1BTX is stable. It is
well-known (see e.g. Lancaster & Rodman, 1995, Proposition 7.9.2) that such a solution, if it
exists, is unique.
If X and Y are finite dimensional vector spaces and D is an open subset of X , we denote the
derivative of a differentiable map T : D → Y by ∂T and the differential of T at x ∈ D in
the direction h by δT (x;h). We have δT (x;h) = ∂T (x)h (see e.g. Luenberger, 1969, Chapter
7). Partial derivatives and differentials are denoted by ∂i and δi where the index refers to the
corresponding argument.
3 Main Result
If the stabilizing solution X of the ARE exists, it follows from a standard completion of the
squares (see e.g. Willems, 1971, Lemma 6) that





xT (F − F̂ )TR(F − F̂ )xdt
where F̂ := −R−1BTX. This expression shows that J is minimized at F̂ for each initial state
x0. Of course, if the system is controllable, this fact has already been established by Willems
(1971) as noted in the introduction. The next theorem states that the converse statement is
also true. Its proof is based on a variational argument. Grabowski considered in (1993) the
regular positive definite infinite-horizon LQ problem as a parametric optimization problem.
Working in an infinite dimensional context he showed, under a detectability assumption, that
the corresponding ARE has a stabilizing solution using a policy iteration argument. Here we
do not assume detectability nor positive definiteness of the state weighting matrix.
Theorem 3.1 Consider the system ẋ = Ax + Bu with (A,B) stabilizable, u = Fx; and the
cost functional J(x0, F ) = x
T
0 ϕ(F )x0 with ϕ defined as in Section 2. If F̂ ∈ F is a minimum
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for J for each x0 ∈ IRn, then X := ϕ(F̂ ) is the stabilizing solution of the ARE.
Proof First note that the set F is a nonempty open set. Secondly note that the smoothness
of the coefficients in a Lyapunov equation is preserved by the solution of this equation (see e.g.
Lancaster & Rodman, 1995, Section 5.4), which implies that J is differentiable with respect to
F . Now, let F̂ ∈ F be a minimum of J for each x0. Then (see e.g. Luenberger, 1969, Section
7.4, Theorem 1) δ2J(x0, F̂ ;∆F ) = 0 for each ∆F and for each x0. We have δ2J(x0, F̂ ;∆F ) =
xT0 δϕ(F̂ ;∆F )x0, which implies that δϕ(F̂ ;∆F ) = 0 for all increments ∆F . Hence
∂ϕ(F̂ ) = 0. (4)
Next, we introduce the map Φ : F × IRn×n → IRn×n by
Φ(F, P ) = (A+BF )TP + P (A+BF ) +Q+ FTRF.
By definition, see (2), we have Φ(F,ϕ(F )) = 0 for all F ∈ F . Taking the derivative of this
equality and applying the chain rule yields
∂1Φ(F,ϕ(F )) + ∂2Φ(F,ϕ(F ))∂ϕ(F ) = 0 for all F ∈ F .
Substituting F = F̂ in this equality, and using (4), we obtain ∂1Φ(F̂ ,ϕ(F̂ )) = 0, or, equivalently,
δ1Φ(F̂ ,ϕ(F̂ );∆F ) = 0 for all ∆F. (5)
The differential of Φ with respect to its first argument with increment ∆F is
δ1Φ(F,P ;∆F ) = ∆F
T (BTP +RF ) + (PB + FTR)∆F.
Combining this result with (5) produces
∆FT (BTϕ(F̂ ) +RF̂ ) + (ϕ(F̂ )B + F̂TR)∆F = 0 for all ∆F,
which clearly implies that BTϕ(F̂ ) +RF̂ = 0, or, equivalently, F̂ = −R−1BTϕ(F̂ ). Now, since
Φ(F̂ ,ϕ(F̂ )) = 0, we conclude that X := ϕ(F̂ ) is the stabilizing solution of the ARE. []
Combining this theorem with the statement preceding the theorem we have the following result.
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Corollary 3.2 The IRZILQ problem has a solution in the class of linear time-invariant state
feedback controls (i.e. (iii) holds) if and only if the ARE (3) has a stabilizing solution. If this
condition holds, the solution is uniquely given by F = −R−1BTX where X is the stabilizing
solution of the ARE.
The existence of the stabilizing solution of the ARE can for instance be verified by check-
ing whether the corresponding Hamiltonian matrix has no purely imaginary eigenvalues, and
whether a rank condition on the matrix sign of a certain matrix is satisfied (Lancaster & Rod-
man, 1995, Theorem 22.4.1, or Laub, 1991, p. 175). An extensive literature on algorithms for
accurately computing the matrix sign exists, and a comprehensive list of references can be found
in the review paper of Laub (1991).
4 Stochastic Interpretation
In addition to the five statements (i),. . .,(v) presented in Section 1, we consider a sixth statement
in this section. This statement is related to the infinite-horizon LQG problem with the state
available for feedback (see e.g. Anderson & Moore, 1989, Section 8.2). We will show that
the sixth statement, which will formally be introduced below, is equivalent to statement (iii)
(Lemma 4.2 below). This implies that the existence of the stabilizing solution of the ARE is
also necessary and sufficient for the solvability of the IRSILQG problem (introduced below) in
the class of linear internally stabilizing state feedback controls.
Let S be the set of all real positive semi-definite n× n-matrices. Consider the following indefi-
nite, regular, full-state-information, infinite-horizon LQG (IRSILQG) problem. Find a feedback
matrix F̂ ∈ F which minimizes for each S ∈ S the criterion L : S ×F → IR, defined by









with Q = QT , R > 0, u = Fx, and where x is generated by a linear noisy system, i.e.
ẋ = Ax+Bu+w (7)
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with a white Gaussian noise w of zero mean and covariance Sδ(t − τ). The initial state is
assumed to be a Gaussian random variable independent of w. Our setting differs from the
setup of Anderson & Moore (1989) in that we do not assume Q to be positive semi-definite and
furthermore, we require the solution to be independent of the covariance matrix S. Indefinite
LQG problems have recently been studied by several authors. See e.g. Ait Rami, Zhou, &
Moore (2000) and references therein. However, the setting of Ait Rami et al. is different in
several respects. In particular, they consider multiplicative noise.
We call the IRSILQG problem solvable if:
(vi) ∃F̂ ∈ F ∀S ∈ S ∀F ∈ F L(S, F̂ ) ≤ L(S, F ).
We show that (iii)⇔ (vi) (Lemma 4.2). Using the result of the previous section this implies that
(vi)⇔ (v) (Corollary 4.3). The implication (v)⇔ (vi) is well-known for a positive semi-definite
Q, but is usually proved in a different way. We first need the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 For each S ∈ S and F ∈ F we have
L(S, F ) = tr(Sϕ(F )), (8)
where ϕ is defined in Section 2.
Proof Let S ∈ S and F ∈ F . Analogously to e.g. Anderson & Moore, 1989, Equation (8.2-11)
one can show that L(S,F ) can be written as L(S,F ) = tr
³
W (Q+ FTRF )
´
, where W is the
unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
(A+BF )W +W (A+BF )T = −S.
Denote P = ϕ(F ). Multiplying the Lyapunov equation (2) by W produces
W (Q+ FTRF ) = −W (A+BF )TP −WP (A+BF ).
Hence, it is easily seen that L(S,F ) = tr(SP ). []
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Lemma 4.2 Let the cost functionals J and L, as defined in (1) and (6) respectively, correspond
to the same parameter set (A,B,Q,R). Then (iii) and (vi) are equivalent.
Proof (⇒) Choose F̂ as the feedback matrix corresponding to statement (iii). Let S ∈ S and
F ∈ F . Since S is positive semi-definite there exists a matrix Y such that S = Y Y T . Denote
the i-th column of Y by yi. From (8) it follows that
L(S, F ) = tr(Sϕ(F )) = tr(Y Tϕ(F )Y ) =
nX
i=1




For each i = 1, . . . , n we have J(yi, F̂ ) ≤ J(yi, F ). Hence
L(S, F̂ ) =
nX
i=1
J(yi, F̂ ) ≤
nX
i=1
J(yi, F ) = L(S, F ).
(⇐) Choose F̂ as the feedback matrix corresponding to statement (vi). Let x0 ∈ IRn and F ∈ F .
Define the matrix S := x0x
T
0 . Clearly, we have S ∈ S, which implies that L(S, F̂ ) ≤ L(S, F ).
Hence, using (8) we find
J(x0, F̂ ) = x
T
0 ϕ(F̂ )x0 = tr(Sϕ(F̂ )) = L(S, F̂ ) ≤ L(S,F ) = J(x0, F ). []
Combining this result with the results of the previous section yields the following result.
Corollary 4.3 The IRSILQG problem has a solution (independent of the covariance matrix)
if and only if the ARE (3) has a stabilizing solution. If this condition holds, the solution is
uniquely given by F = −R−1BTX with X the stabilizing solution of the ARE.
5 An Application to LQ Differential Games
In this section we use the equivalence results from the two preceding sections to characterize
feedback Nash equilibria in infinite-horizon LQ differential games both in a deterministic and a
stochastic context.
The following notation will be used. For an N-tuple F̂ = (F̂1, . . . , F̂N) ∈ Γ1×· · ·×ΓN for given
sets Γi, we shall write F̂−i(α) = (F̂1, . . . , F̂i−1,α, F̂i+1, . . . , F̂N) with α ∈ Γi.
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5.1 The Deterministic Case
Consider the cost function of player i defined by











Bjuj, x(0) = x0.
Assume that Qi is symmetric, Rii is positive definite and (F1, . . . , FN) ∈ FN , where
FN =






This last assumption spoils the rectangular structure of the strategy spaces, i.e. choices of
feedback matrices cannot be made independently. However, such a restriction is motivated by
the fact that closed-loop stability is usually a common objective.
In our setting the concept of a feedback Nash equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 An N-tuple F̂ = (F̂1, . . . , F̂N) ∈ FN is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if for
all i the following inequality holds:
Ji(x0, F̂ ) ≤ Ji(x0, F̂−i(α))
for each x0 and for each state feedback matrix α such that F̂−i(α) ∈ FN .



























j Xj = 0, i = 1, . . . , N. (10)
A stabilizing solution of (10) is an N-tuple (X1, . . . , XN) of real symmetric n × n matrices
satisfying (10) such that A−PNj=1BjR−1jj BTj Xj is stable. In contrast to the stabilizing solution
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of (3), stabilizing solutions of (10) are not necessarily unique (see e.g. Weeren et al. (1999)). The
next theorem states that feedback Nash equilibria are completely characterized by stabilizing
solutions of (10). Its proof follows straightforwardly from Corollary 3.2.
Theorem 5.2 Let (X1, . . . ,XN) be a stabilizing solution of (10) and define Fi := −R−1ii BTi Xi
for i = 1, . . . ,N . Then (F1, . . . , FN) is a feedback Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if (F1, . . . , FN)
is a feedback Nash equilibrium, there exists a stabilizing solution (X1, . . . ,XN) of (10) such that
Fi = −R−1ii BTi Xi.
The restriction that feedback matrices belong to the set FN is essential. Indeed, there exist
feedback Nash equilibria in which a player can improve unilaterally by choosing a feedback
matrix for which the closed-loop system is unstable (Mageirou, 1976).
5.2 The Stochastic Case
Now consider

















with w, x0 as defined in (7) and Qi, Rii as defined in the previous section. The information
structure of the players is assumed to be a perfect state feedback pattern. Next, introduce
Definition 5.3 An N-tuple F̂ = (F̂1, . . . , F̂N) ∈ FN is called a stochastic variance-independent
feedback Nash equilibrium if for all i the following inequality holds:
Li(S, F̂ ) ≤ Li(S, F̂−i(α))
for each S ∈ S and for each state feedback matrix α such that F̂−i(α) ∈ FN .
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Then, the following theorem, which follows straightforwardly from Corollary 4.3, characterizes
all stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5.4 Let (X1, . . . ,XN) be a stabilizing solution of (10) and define Fi := −R−1ii BTi Xi
for i = 1, . . . , N . Then (F1, . . . , FN) is a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equi-
librium. Conversely, if (F1, . . . , FN) is a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilib-
rium, there exists a stabilizing solution (X1, . . . ,XN) of (10) such that Fi = −R−1ii BTi Xi.
We conclude that for a given parameter set (A,Bi, Qi, Rij) the set of stochastic variance-
independent feedback Nash equilibria coincides with the set of feedback Nash equilibria cor-
responding to the deterministic case.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the existence of a stabilizing solution of the ARE is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the unique solvability of the IRZILQ problem in the class of linear state
feedback controls. Furthermore, we have also shown that this unique solution coincides with
the unique solution of the IRSILQG problem in the class of linear state feedback controls. The
equivalence results have been generalized to a differential game setting in both a deterministic
and stochastic context, with a perfect state feedback information pattern for the players.
Acknowledgements: The authors like to thank the anonymous referees for their comments
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